Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 93A is famous for turning unfair or deceptive business conduct into a serious litigation problem, complete with potential attorney’s fees and multiple damages. Before a court reaches those fireworks, however, it must answer a quieter but decisive question: does a Massachusetts court have authority over the out-of-state defendant at all?
Two decisions issued by the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts on December 4, 2025, provide a useful side-by-side lesson. In Mayur, LLC v. Freedom Foods, LLC, the court dismissed a contract-centered Chapter 93A dispute against a Vermont manufacturer for lack of personal jurisdiction. In Doane v. Python Leads, LLC, the same judge found jurisdiction over a Florida executive whose company allegedly directed repeated telemarketing calls into Massachusetts.
The decisions are not inconsistent. They show that personal jurisdiction depends less on where the plaintiff lives and more on what the defendant deliberately did, where the relevant conduct occurred, and how closely that conduct connects to the claims. Chapter 93A may be a powerful engine, but personal jurisdiction still holds the keys.
Why Personal Jurisdiction Matters in Chapter 93A Litigation
Chapter 93A prohibits unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in trade or commerce. Consumers generally sue under Section 9, while businesses operating in a commercial context generally proceed under Section 11. The statute can provide significant remedies, but it does not automatically pull every nonresident company, officer, vendor, or online operator into a Massachusetts courtroom.
When a defendant challenges personal jurisdiction, a federal court sitting in Massachusetts ordinarily examines two separate gates. First, jurisdiction must fit within the Massachusetts long-arm statute, M.G.L. c. 223A, Section 3. Second, exercising jurisdiction must satisfy constitutional due process.
The Three-Part Specific Jurisdiction Test
Most cross-border Chapter 93A disputes concern specific jurisdiction rather than general jurisdiction. General jurisdiction usually applies when a defendant is essentially “at home” in the forum. Specific jurisdiction is case-linked and asks whether the particular lawsuit is sufficiently connected to the defendant’s Massachusetts activities.
The due process analysis commonly considers three elements:
- Relatedness: The claims must arise out of or relate to the defendant’s activities connected to Massachusetts.
- Purposeful availment: The defendant must have voluntarily created meaningful contacts with Massachusetts, making litigation there reasonably foreseeable.
- Reasonableness: Exercising jurisdiction must be fair under the circumstances.
A plaintiff cannot ordinarily satisfy this test simply by pointing to its Massachusetts address or to financial harm felt in the Commonwealth. The focus remains on the defendant’s suit-related conduct. A Massachusetts mailing address is not jurisdictional fairy dust.
Case One: Mayur, LLC v. Freedom Foods, LLC
A Massachusetts Brand, a Vermont Manufacturer, and Moldy Yogurt Snacks
Mayur, LLC, doing business as Pariva, was a Massachusetts-based company that sold marinated yogurt bites. Freedom Foods, LLC was a Vermont contract manufacturer that helped specialty food businesses increase production. The parties discussed production arrangements and equipment placement, and Freedom Foods manufactured Pariva’s product at its Vermont facility.
After the production runs, Pariva allegedly found mold in much of the product. It initiated a voluntary recall and claimed that equipment returned by Freedom Foods was unclean, damaged, or missing parts. Pariva sued in Massachusetts, asserting breach of contract, breach of warranty, quantum meruit, and Chapter 93A claims.
Freedom Foods removed the case from Suffolk Superior Court to federal court and moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. It alternatively requested dismissal for improper venue or transfer to the federal court in Vermont.
Why the Massachusetts Contacts Were Not Enough
Pariva identified several connections to Massachusetts. It was based in the Commonwealth. The parties exchanged interstate communications. Some finished products were shipped to Massachusetts, and Freedom Foods had previously worked with other Massachusetts businesses.
Those facts established contacts, but the court found that they did not create the necessary claim-specific connection.
The alleged misconduct occurred predominantly in Vermont. The yogurt snacks were manufactured there. The claimed sanitation failures and cost-saving production decisions happened there. The disputed equipment was used, maintained, and initially retained there. Even though Pariva experienced financial consequences in Massachusetts, the alleged breaches resulted from choices and actions centered in Vermont.
The court also found insufficient evidence that the relevant contracts were formed in Massachusetts or subjected Freedom Foods to substantial continuing control from Massachusetts. Communications with an in-state business and delivery of products to the Commonwealth did not, by themselves, establish that the Massachusetts contacts were instrumental to contract formation or breach.
That distinction defeated the relatedness requirement. Because relatedness is necessary for specific jurisdiction, the court did not need to complete the purposeful-availment and reasonableness portions of the constitutional test.
The Chapter 93A Label Did Not Create a New Jurisdictional Connection
Pariva’s Chapter 93A count relied on the same conduct described in its contract, warranty, and quasi-contract claims. It did not identify separate unfair or deceptive acts tied specifically to Massachusetts. The court therefore applied the same personal-jurisdiction analysis to the Chapter 93A count.
This is a major pleading lesson. Adding the words “unfair or deceptive” does not transform out-of-state contract performance into Massachusetts conduct. When a Chapter 93A claim merely repackages a contract theory, its jurisdictional fate may travel with the contract claim.
The court dismissed the action without prejudice, leaving Pariva free to file in a court that had authority over Freedom Foods.
Why Jurisdictional Discovery Was Denied
Pariva alternatively requested discovery about Freedom Foods’ transactions and communications with other Massachusetts businesses. The court denied that request because the proposed discovery would not address the fundamental problem.
Evidence of other Massachusetts customers might help show that Freedom Foods had voluntarily conducted business in the state. It would not show that Pariva’s claims arose out of or related to those other transactions. The missing element was relatedness, not general evidence of commercial activity.
Discovery that cannot cure the controlling jurisdictional defect is merely an expensive scenic route.
Case Two: Doane v. Python Leads, LLC
Calls From Abroad, Alleged Targeting in Massachusetts
Robert Doane, a Massachusetts resident, alleged that Python Leads, LLC and its cofounders participated in a telemarketing operation that generated Medicare and final-expense-insurance leads. Python was based in Florida and operated call centers in Pakistan.
Doane claimed that he received at least 23 unsolicited calls over approximately two months even though his number appeared on both federal and Massachusetts do-not-call registries. The complaint also alleged that the defendants manufactured evidence suggesting that he had consented to receive the calls.
Among the defendants was Jacquelyn Levine, a Florida resident identified as Python’s founder, chief executive officer, and sole member. Levine argued that Massachusetts lacked personal jurisdiction over her because she lived outside the Commonwealth and did not personally dial Doane’s number.
Physical Absence Did Not End the Inquiry
The court rejected the idea that Levine’s physical absence from Massachusetts resolved the jurisdictional issue. A person can deliberately direct conduct into a state without ever entering it, particularly when telephones, online marketing, agents, contractors, and international call centers are involved.
The jurisdictional record allegedly showed that Levine helped create call scripts, established and trained call-center operations, communicated regularly with callers, signed a lead-generation agreement, and exercised substantial oversight over Python’s business. Evidence also indicated that she personally received several payments connected to the operation.
The court therefore had more than an executive title to examine. It had allegations and evidence connecting Levine’s own decisions to the challenged telemarketing activity.
The Massachusetts Long-Arm Statute
The Massachusetts long-arm statute allows jurisdiction in certain cases involving intentional conduct that causes injury in the Commonwealth. The relevant conduct does not necessarily have to occur physically inside Massachusetts. Intentional acts directed into Massachusetts can qualify when they begin a chain of events that produces an in-state injury.
The court found sufficient evidence at the preliminary stage that Python’s operation intentionally targeted Massachusetts residents. The record included 198 live-transferred calls involving Massachusetts consumers between March 2021 and March 2023, in addition to the 23 calls allegedly made to Doane.
Levine’s alleged oversight, participation, and financial benefit supported the conclusion that she personally participated in the operation rather than merely occupying a distant corporate office.
Relatedness Was Direct and Concrete
Unlike the manufacturing dispute in Mayur, the Massachusetts contacts in Doane were the conduct giving rise to the lawsuit. The calls directed to Massachusetts consumers were not background business activities. They were the alleged legal violations.
Doane’s claims therefore had a strong relationship with Levine, Massachusetts, and the litigation. The alleged supervision of the callers, development of scripts, and repeated calls to Massachusetts residents created the required nexus.
Purposeful Availment and a Nationwide Campaign
The court also found purposeful availment. The calls were allegedly deliberate and repeated rather than random, isolated, or accidental. By directing an operation that repeatedly contacted Massachusetts consumers, Levine could reasonably anticipate being required to defend related claims in Massachusetts.
It did not matter that the campaign allegedly targeted consumers across the United States. A nationwide campaign does not become jurisdiction-proof merely because it reaches many states. Massachusetts can still be purposefully targeted as one part of a broader campaign.
Exercising Jurisdiction Was Reasonable
The final constitutional question was fairness. Levine argued that defending the case in Massachusetts would create financial and logistical burdens. The court found that a generalized claim of inconvenience was insufficient.
Litigation in another state is almost always inconvenient to some degree. A defendant ordinarily must identify an unusual or constitutionally significant burden, not merely the cost and hassle that accompany most interstate lawsuits.
Massachusetts also had a substantial interest in providing a forum for a resident allegedly injured by unlawful calls directed into the Commonwealth. Doane had an interest in obtaining relief where he lived and allegedly received the calls.
The Chapter 93A Claim Survived
Doane’s consumer claim under Chapter 93A was based on allegations of repeated unauthorized calls and fabricated consent records. The court concluded that those allegations plausibly described unfair or deceptive conduct, an injury, and a causal connection between the conduct and the injury.
The required pre-suit demand under Section 9 was not disputed. Levine’s motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim were denied.
The ruling did not decide that Levine ultimately violated Chapter 93A. It decided that the pleadings and preliminary evidence were sufficient for the case to continue. Jurisdiction opens the courthouse door; it does not hand the plaintiff the trophy.
What the Two Massachusetts Cases Teach Together
1. The Plaintiff’s Location Is Not the Center of Gravity
In Mayur, the plaintiff’s Massachusetts base and in-state economic injury did not establish jurisdiction because the alleged defective performance occurred in Vermont. In Doane, Massachusetts was central because the challenged calls were deliberately directed to residents of the Commonwealth.
2. Relatedness Is Claim-Specific
Courts do not simply count emails, shipments, customers, or phone calls and declare a winner. They ask whether those contacts matter to the claims being litigated. A hundred unrelated Massachusetts customers may be less useful than one communication that forms, performs, or breaches the transaction in dispute.
3. A Derivative Chapter 93A Claim Inherits Weaknesses
When a Chapter 93A claim duplicates a contract theory without identifying separate Massachusetts-centered misconduct, it may inherit the contract claim’s jurisdictional shortcomings.
A well-developed Chapter 93A count should identify the allegedly unfair act, the actor responsible for it, the location or target of the act, the resulting injury, and the act’s connection to Massachusetts.
4. Corporate Titles Alone Are Not Enough
Doane does not mean that every chief executive is personally subject to jurisdiction wherever the company conducts business. The decision relied on allegations and evidence of direct oversight, operational participation, control, targeting, and personal benefit.
Status alone is weak. Conduct is what gives a corporate title jurisdictional weight.
5. The Actions of Agents Can Matter
A defendant need not personally make every call, send every message, or complete every sale. Conduct performed by employees or agents may become relevant when the defendant directed, controlled, approved, or substantially influenced those activities.
That principle is especially important for digital advertising, call centers, lead generators, affiliate marketing networks, and outsourced service providers. Delegating the dialing does not necessarily delegate away jurisdictional exposure.
6. Jurisdictional Discovery Must Target the Missing Element
Both cases denied jurisdictional discovery, but for different reasons. In Mayur, the proposed discovery would not repair the absence of relatedness. In Doane, the existing evidence already supported jurisdiction, making further discovery unnecessary.
A focused request should explain precisely what facts are missing, where the evidence is likely to be found, and how it would establish a statutory or constitutional requirement.
Personal Jurisdiction Is Not the Same as Chapter 93A’s Territorial Test
Lawyers should avoid blending two separate questions. Personal jurisdiction asks whether the court has authority over the defendant. Chapter 93A’s substantive and territorial requirements ask whether the statute applies to the challenged conduct and whether the plaintiff has stated a viable claim.
For business-to-business claims under Section 11, the plaintiff must confront the requirement that the unfair or deceptive conduct occurred “primarily and substantially” within Massachusetts. That inquiry is not identical to personal jurisdiction.
A defendant may have enough Massachusetts contacts to be sued in the Commonwealth while still arguing that the actionable misconduct was centered elsewhere. Conversely, a strongly pleaded Chapter 93A theory cannot proceed against a defendant over whom the court lacks personal jurisdiction.
Consumers proceeding under Section 9 generally must send a written demand for relief at least 30 days before filing suit, subject to statutory exceptions. That demand concerns the claim, settlement opportunities, and potential remedies. It does not manufacture jurisdiction over a nonresident recipient.
Practical Experience: Building or Defending the Jurisdictional Record
The most useful practical lesson from cross-border Chapter 93A disputes is that jurisdiction should be investigated like a factual claim. It should not be treated as a ceremonial paragraph near the end of the complaint.
Parties sometimes devote pages to describing alleged unfairness and then use three sentences to explain why the defendant can be sued in Massachusetts. That approach is risky whenever a Rule 12(b)(2) motion is predictable.
For Plaintiffs: Build a Contact-to-Claim Map
Begin with a chronology. Identify who initiated the relationship, who targeted Massachusetts, where negotiations occurred, where contracts were accepted, where performance took place, where misleading statements were sent and received, and where the defendant expected its conduct to have an effect.
Next, connect each jurisdictional fact to a specific legal claim. A general relationship with Massachusetts is less valuable than evidence linking Massachusetts conduct to the alleged breach, deception, call, transaction, or injury.
Preserve the records that make the allegations provable: emails, contracts, recordings, call logs, shipping documents, payment instructions, consent records, website analytics, geographic targeting rules, internal scripts, and statements by company officers.
In Doane, operational details about control of the call centers mattered. In Mayur, broader evidence that the manufacturer had other Massachusetts customers did not answer how the disputed contracts were formed or breached.
Jurisdictional allegations should be concrete. “The defendant does business in Massachusetts” is largely a conclusion. “The defendant’s executive approved a campaign that produced 198 transfers involving Massachusetts consumers” is a factual theory.
For Defendants: Separate Market Presence From Suit-Related Conduct
An out-of-state company should not assume that selling nationally makes every forum proper, but it should not assume the opposite either. Review the particular transaction, service, or campaign.
Did employees directly solicit Massachusetts residents? Was a Massachusetts account specifically managed? Did an executive approve state-focused conduct? Did the contract require continuing performance in Massachusetts? Did the company use geographic filters, Massachusetts area codes, localized advertising, or state-specific sales lists?
A carefully prepared declaration can establish where negotiations, execution, manufacturing, services, decisions, and alleged misconduct occurred. It should also explain who controlled the challenged activities.
A statement such as “I never entered Massachusetts” may miss the point. Electronic targeting, agents, calls, and communications can create forum contacts without anyone buying a plane ticket.
Draft Contracts With Forum Risk in Mind
Cross-border businesses should use clear forum-selection, choice-of-law, notice, delivery, acceptance, and performance provisions. These terms do not solve every jurisdictional question, but ambiguity invites expensive preliminary litigation.
Operational teams should also understand that actual conduct may matter as much as contractual language. A favorable out-of-state forum clause becomes less comforting when the business later directs state-specific conduct into Massachusetts.
Request Jurisdictional Discovery With Precision
A persuasive discovery request should identify the disputed jurisdictional fact, the likely source of evidence, and the legal element the evidence would satisfy.
Requests for every Massachusetts customer, every sale, and every communication may appear to be a fishing expedition when the missing issue is relatedness to one transaction. Courts are more receptive when the requested discovery could realistically change the outcome.
The durable lesson from these two cases is straightforward: plead and prove a Massachusetts connection that belongs to the dispute itself. Personal jurisdiction is not awarded for enthusiasm, creative adjectives, or an especially stern Chapter 93A demand letter. It rests on defendant-focused facts.
Conclusion
Mayur and Doane offer a clean contrast. A Massachusetts plaintiff could not keep a Vermont-centered manufacturing dispute in Massachusetts merely because products and financial losses reached the Commonwealth. A Florida executive, however, could be required to defend in Massachusetts when the record supported deliberate oversight of repeated calls targeting Massachusetts residents.
For Chapter 93A litigants, the strategic question is not simply whether the conduct was unfair. It is whether the defendant created suit-related Massachusetts contacts, whether the claims arise from or relate to those contacts, and whether exercising jurisdiction is fair.
Answer those questions with specific facts, and the jurisdictional analysis becomes manageable. Ignore them, and even a dramatic complaint may leave the courthouse before the merits receive their first cup of coffee.
