It Is Unethical for the United States to Send Hydroxychloroquine to Brazil

During a public-health emergency, international assistance should deliver more than cargo. It should deliver credible evidence, transparent reasoning, and a reasonable expectation that the assistance will help rather than harm. In May 2020, however, the United States sent Brazil two million doses of hydroxychloroquine for use against COVID-19, including proposed preventive use among health-care workers. The shipment arrived when scientific support for that purpose was weak, safety concerns were already public, and the drug had become a political mascot with a prescription label.

The central ethical problem was not that hydroxychloroquine was an inherently illegitimate medicine. It remains useful for conditions such as lupus and rheumatoid arthritis. Nor was the problem simply that scientists had unanswered questions during a rapidly evolving pandemic. Uncertainty was unavoidable. The problem was that a government promoted and exported a medically unproven intervention as assistance without the safeguards normally expected when evidence is uncertain.

Good intentions do not turn weak evidence into strong medicine. A diplomatic gift is still subject to the basic obligations of public health: do good, avoid preventable harm, distribute resources fairly, communicate honestly, and respect the people expected to take the treatment.

What the United States Sent to Brazil

On May 31, 2020, the American and Brazilian governments announced that the United States had delivered two million doses of hydroxychloroquine to Brazil. The official statement said the medication would be used both as a treatment and as prophylaxis for Brazilian nurses, doctors, and other health professionals. The United States also promised 1,000 ventilators, a far more conventional and clearly relevant form of pandemic assistance.

The shipment occurred as Brazil was becoming a global center of the first COVID-19 wave. Hospitals faced enormous pressure, health-care workers needed protection, and political leaders wanted solutions immediately. Hydroxychloroquine appeared to offer an irresistible story: an inexpensive, familiar medication that might be repurposed quickly.

Unfortunately, viruses do not read political speeches. They are famously indifferent to enthusiasm, polling numbers, television interviews, and international friendships.

By the time the shipment was announced, hydroxychloroquine was already one of the most polarizing subjects in medicine. President Donald Trump had repeatedly promoted it, while Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro also publicly supported its use. That political alignment made the shipment look less like neutral scientific cooperation and more like two administrations reinforcing a shared treatment narrative.

The Evidence Was Already Raising Red Flags

Emergency authorization was not proof of effectiveness

In March 2020, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration issued an Emergency Use Authorization allowing certain donated hydroxychloroquine and chloroquine products to be used for some hospitalized COVID-19 patients when clinical trials were unavailable. An emergency authorization is not the same as full approval, and it is certainly not a scientific victory parade. It is a temporary regulatory mechanism used when evidence is incomplete and authorities believe potential benefits may justify potential risks.

Before the shipment to Brazil, the FDA had already warned against using hydroxychloroquine or chloroquine for COVID-19 outside hospitals or clinical trials because of reports of serious heart-rhythm problems. The warning emphasized risks including abnormal electrical activity in the heart, especially when hydroxychloroquine was combined with azithromycin.

That warning matters ethically. The United States was not merely sending a drug whose effectiveness remained uncertain. It was exporting millions of doses while its own regulator was cautioning against broad, poorly supervised use.

Laboratory promise had not become clinical proof

Early enthusiasm came partly from laboratory studies suggesting that chloroquine-related drugs might interfere with the coronavirus under controlled conditions. But activity in a laboratory dish does not establish that a medicine helps real patients at safe doses. The human body is considerably more complicated than a plastic tray, despite the occasional efforts of politicians to treat the two as interchangeable.

Early observational reports and small studies were inconsistent, vulnerable to bias, and unable to establish whether hydroxychloroquine prevented hospitalization, reduced mortality, or protected exposed workers. Medical organizations warned that prophylactic use was unsupported and that widespread prescribing could expose people to harm while disrupting access for established patients. The American College of Physicians and its journal published cautions about using the medication outside carefully designed studies, while the American Medical Association emphasized responsible prescribing and the protection of necessary drug supplies.

Why the Shipment Was Ethically Problematic

1. It violated the duty to avoid preventable harm

The principle of nonmaleficenceoften summarized as “do no harm”does not require doctors or governments to eliminate every risk. Nearly every effective medical treatment has possible side effects. It does require that risks be justified by credible evidence of potential benefit and managed through appropriate monitoring.

Hydroxychloroquine can affect the heart’s electrical rhythm, interact with other drugs, and cause additional adverse effects. These risks may be acceptable when the medication is used for a condition in which benefits are established and patients are properly evaluated. They are harder to justify when millions of doses are promoted for an unproven purpose, particularly prophylaxis among workers who may be healthy and receive little or no benefit.

A preventive intervention deserves especially careful scrutiny. Giving a drug to a sick person with few alternatives is ethically different from giving it to large numbers of healthy people “just in case.” The acceptable risk threshold should generally be lower when recipients are not ill.

2. It converted Brazilian workers into an informal experiment

Experimental use is not automatically unethical. Clinical research is essential, especially during a new pandemic. Ethical experimentation, however, requires protocols, informed consent, eligibility rules, safety monitoring, independent review, meaningful data collection, and a plan for responding to adverse events.

Distributing a politically favored drug outside that structure can create the risks of an experiment without producing reliable knowledge. If thousands of health-care workers take a medication without randomization, control groups, consistent testing, or standardized follow-up, officials may be unable to determine whether it prevented infections, caused adverse events, or accomplished nothing at all.

That is the worst of both worlds: people accept uncertain risks, yet society may learn very little from their experience.

3. It weakened informed consent

Consent is not meaningful when recipients are led to believe that an uncertain intervention is proven protection. Health-care workers operating during a frightening outbreak may feel pressure to accept whatever their employers or governments present as a defensive measure.

True informed consent would have required clear statements that hydroxychloroquine had not been shown to prevent COVID-19, that the FDA had raised safety concerns, and that taking the medication should not replace masks, infection-control practices, testing, ventilation, or other protective measures.

When presidents enthusiastically promote a treatment, that political endorsement can distort risk communication. A technically voluntary choice may feel compulsory when the medicine is presented as patriotic, hopeful, or professionally responsible.

4. It threatened fair access for patients who actually needed the drug

Hydroxychloroquine was not sitting on pharmacy shelves waiting for a pandemic-themed career change. Patients with lupus, rheumatoid arthritis, and related conditions already depended on it.

During the early months of 2020, patient organizations reported shortages and difficulty filling prescriptions. The Arthritis Foundation and other medical advocacy groups warned that patients were rationing medication or losing access because demand had surged after hydroxychloroquine was promoted for COVID-19. For many people with lupus, the drug is a cornerstone of long-term treatment rather than a speculative option.

Exporting two million doses for an unproven indication therefore raised a question of distributive justice: Were scarce supplies being allocated according to medical need, or according to political visibility?

A fair system should protect established patients before building enormous stockpiles for hypothetical benefits. Otherwise, one group pays a very real price for another group’s medical gamble.

5. It blurred the boundary between diplomacy and science

International health aid should be based on the recipient country’s needs, credible medical evidence, and transparent public-health priorities. When aid promotes a treatment closely associated with the political identities of two presidents, it risks becoming pharmaceutical theater.

The appearance of political motivation matters because public trust is a medical resource. Once people suspect that treatments are selected to support leaders rather than patients, they may become skeptical of later recommendations, including recommendations supported by strong evidence.

Public-health institutions cannot afford to behave like marketing departments. Their credibility takes years to build and approximately one televised miracle cure to damage.

The Strongest Argument in Favor of the Shipment

A fair ethical analysis must acknowledge the extraordinary uncertainty of spring 2020. COVID-19 was spreading rapidly, health systems were overwhelmed, vaccines were unavailable, and clinicians had few proven treatments. Waiting for perfect evidence would also have had consequences.

Supporters could reasonably argue that hydroxychloroquine was inexpensive, already manufactured at scale, familiar to physicians, and supported by enough preliminary evidence to justify compassionate or emergency use. Brazil remained free to decide how to distribute it, and the shipment could have supported controlled research rather than routine prescribing.

Those points reduce the temptation to judge the decision solely with hindsight. Officials in May 2020 did not possess every result that became available later.

Nevertheless, emergency uncertainty does not erase ethical standards. It makes those standards more important. The shipment was announced for treatment and prophylaxis, not narrowly limited to randomized trials. Safety warnings already existed. Evidence for prevention was particularly weak. Established patients were reporting access problems. Political leaders were making confident public claims that exceeded the science.

The ethical alternative was not paralysis. It was disciplined action: send ventilators and protective equipment, fund high-quality trials, expand laboratory capacity, strengthen hospital systems, and provide any experimental medication through transparent research protocols.

What Later Research Found

Subsequent randomized trials confirmed the concerns surrounding the shipment. A New England Journal of Medicine trial found that hydroxychloroquine did not prevent illness after exposure to COVID-19. Another randomized trial conducted in Brazil found no improvement in clinical outcomes among hospitalized patients with mild-to-moderate disease who received hydroxychloroquine, with or without azithromycin.

The large RECOVERY trial found no reduction in 28-day mortality among hospitalized patients receiving hydroxychloroquine. A U.S. randomized trial involving 479 hospitalized adults likewise found no significant improvement in clinical status, leading investigators to conclude that the results did not support its use.

On June 15, 2020only about two weeks after the shipment was announcedthe FDA revoked its Emergency Use Authorization. The agency concluded that hydroxychloroquine and chloroquine were unlikely to be effective for the authorized COVID-19 uses and that their known and potential benefits no longer outweighed their known and potential risks.

The National Institutes of Health later halted its hospitalized-patient trial after an independent review found that hydroxychloroquine provided no additional benefit over placebo. Federal guidance and professional infectious-disease recommendations subsequently advised against using it for COVID-19 treatment or prevention.

These later findings do not prove that every official supporting the shipment acted with malicious intent. They do show why political confidence should never substitute for clinical evidence.

What Ethical American Assistance Would Have Looked Like

Prioritize resources with demonstrated value

The United States could have emphasized ventilators, oxygen-delivery systems, testing materials, personal protective equipment, hospital staffing assistance, and infection-control training. Unlike mass prophylaxis with hydroxychloroquine, these resources addressed identifiable needs without depending on an unproven pharmacological theory.

Support controlled multinational trials

If American and Brazilian authorities believed hydroxychloroquine remained promising, they could have funded a well-designed joint trial. Participants would receive proper screening and informed consent, researchers would monitor heart rhythms and drug interactions, and outcomes would contribute to global knowledge.

Protect existing patients

Before moving millions of doses into speculative programs, officials should have assessed supply-chain effects on people using hydroxychloroquine for approved conditions. Dedicated reserves could have prevented research or emergency programs from disrupting ordinary treatment.

Separate public communication from political branding

Statements should have described hydroxychloroquine as experimental, acknowledged conflicting evidence, explained known risks, and made clear that it could not replace protective equipment or infection-control measures. Leaders should have allowed medical agenciesnot political personalitiesto explain the scientific status of the drug.

Experience-Based Lessons From the Hydroxychloroquine Episode

The experiences reported by clinicians, patients, pharmacists, and researchers during the hydroxychloroquine controversy reveal how quickly a medical hypothesis can escape the laboratory and become a cultural identity. Once that happens, correcting the record becomes much harder than evaluating the original evidence.

Clinicians experienced pressure from frightened patients who had heard that the drug might prevent infection or cure COVID-19. Some people arrived expecting a prescription rather than a medical evaluation. Doctors then had to explain why a medicine described enthusiastically by national leaders was not necessarily appropriate for an individual patient. That conversation consumed time, strained trust, and placed physicians in the awkward position of appearing to contradict their own government.

Pharmacists faced a different problem. They had to balance sudden demand against the needs of patients with valid long-term prescriptions. Restrictions introduced to preserve supplies sometimes created additional paperwork and delays, even for people who had safely used hydroxychloroquine for years. The prescribing surge documented during the early pandemic illustrates how quickly public statements can influence medication use across an entire health system.

Patients with lupus and inflammatory diseases experienced the controversy not as an abstract debate but as uncertainty at the pharmacy counter. Some worried about missed doses, disease flares, or being forced to change a treatment that had kept their condition stable. Their experience offers an important lesson: repurposing an old medicine does not make its supply unlimited. Every tablet redirected toward an unproven use may be unavailable to someone with a documented need.

Researchers experienced the exhausting difficulty of conducting careful science in an environment demanding immediate certainty. Preliminary findings were amplified before peer review, observational reports were treated like randomized trials, and individual studies became political weapons. When later trials produced negative results, supporters sometimes interpreted the findings as evidence of conspiracy rather than the ordinary process of scientific correction.

The episode also demonstrated why medical communication should state what is known, what is unknown, and what would change the recommendation. Saying “we do not yet know” can sound unsatisfying during a crisis, but honest uncertainty is more trustworthy than false reassurance. The goal is not to remove hope. It is to prevent hope from being packaged as clinical proof.

Brazil’s experience was particularly instructive because the country had the scientific capacity to conduct meaningful research. Brazilian investigators contributed important randomized evidence showing that hydroxychloroquine, with or without azithromycin, did not improve outcomes in hospitalized patients with mild-to-moderate COVID-19. That research created knowledge. Merely shipping and distributing tablets could not.

For future emergencies, officials should treat experimental treatments as questions to be tested, not gifts to be celebrated. International partnerships should combine access with monitoring, independent oversight, public reporting, and protections for established patients. A country receiving assistance should not receive a lower standard of evidence simply because its hospitals are under pressure.

The broadest lesson is that urgency and rigor are partners, not enemies. Rapid trials can be organized. Safety data can be collected quickly. Governments can communicate uncertainty without becoming paralyzed. What they should not do is fill an evidence gap with political volume.

Conclusion: Assistance Must Be More Than a Shipment

The decision to send two million doses of hydroxychloroquine to Brazil was unethical because the program elevated political enthusiasm over reliable evidence, exposed recipients to risks without a demonstrated preventive benefit, threatened access for established patients, and blurred the line between humanitarian aid and ideological promotion.

The ethical criticism does not depend entirely on hindsight. Before the shipment, regulators had warned about cardiac risks, professional groups had questioned unsupported prophylactic use, and patients with lupus and rheumatoid arthritis were already reporting shortages. Later clinical trials merely made the scientific failure clearer.

International solidarity is valuable, especially during a pandemic. But solidarity should provide effective equipment, trustworthy information, fair access, and properly governed research. Sending a vast supply of an unproven medicine may look decisive in a press release. Ethical public health asks the more important question: Did the decision respect evidence and protect the people expected to swallow the pills?